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Abstract
Deep Learning techniques have achieved remarkable re-
sults in many domains. Often, training deep learning mod-
els requires large datasets, which may require sensitive in-
formation to be uploaded to the cloud to accelerate training.
To adequately protect sensitive information, we propose dis-
tributed layer-partitioned training with step-wise activation
functions for privacy-preserving deep learning. Experimen-
tal results attest our method to be simple and effective.
1 Introduction
Since 2012, neural networks and deep architectures have
proven very effective in application areas such as computer
vision [6] and disease diagnosis [3]. Although deep archi-
tectures such as convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [5]
emerged as early as the 1980s, they have not risen into the
spotlight until now. Their recent popularity is due to the
rising importance of scale, in both data volume and compu-
tation resources [2].
When the data scale or data volume is small, a local com-
puter can handle the training workload. However, when
data volume is large, even one-hundredth of AlphaGo’s
scale, most local computing facilities do not have sufficient
computation resources to complete training tasks in a timely
fashion. Take training AlexNet [9] as an example. The task
of training one million images took more than one week on
a typical local host. Considering that training parameters
such as learning rate and momentum must be experimented
upon to find the best settings, tens of rounds of training
are required. Thus, a training task can demand weeks on
a typical local host to complete. This long latency is not
feasible for many urgent applications such as national se-
curity, investment decisions, and disease outbreak predic-
tion. The logical solution is to upload data onto the cloud
to take advantage of the distributed computing resources.
However, many institutions such as the government, hospi-
tals, and financial institutes forbid data from leaving their
local sites for privacy and security reasons. In this work,
we propose a distributed layer-partitioned training method-
ology that permits metadata (not the original data) to leave
a local site, while at the same time preserving data privacy.
The principal idea is that the original data is processed into
irreversible secured metadata before leaving a local site.
Our method permits substantial training to be run distribu-
tively on the irreversible secured metadata of remote sites,
whereas the original data stays at the local secured site.
2 Related Work
While deep learning is flourishing in many domains, its
privacy concerns have attracted much recent attention. Sev-
eral pieces of research have shown that training data can be
recovered with the access to trained models, which runs the
risk of inadvertently revealing sensitive information. For
example, [4] exploited a model inversion attack to retrieve
recognizable images from a facial-recognition model.
Some previous works have attempted to address deep
learning privacy concerns. [1] adopted differential privacy
in the deep learning training process. Specifically, they
added noises to gradients when applying stochastic gradi-
ent descent (SGD). [14] devised distributed selective SGD,
thereby enabling each client to train its model locally and to
exchange model parameters selectively with the global one
in the cloud server.
Although these approaches can introduce certain diffi-
culties in precisely recovering training samples, they are
still vulnerable to some attacks such as generative adver-
sarial network-based attacks [7]. In contrast, deep learning
models trained using our proposed training methodology
avoid such attacks since the trained models are separated
into two distinct parts. Some works such as [11] applied
cryptographic techniques to address the privacy issues of
deep learning in cloud computing, which is another alterna-
tive but often forces learning over encrypted domains.
3 Brief Introduction of CNN
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is a representative
model and used by our work to study privacy-preserving
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
06
04
9v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  1
2 A
pr
 20
19
schemes. Throughout this paper, we focus on discussing
CNNs, since inputs to CNNs are often images that can be
visualized and are easier to illustrate. However, our pro-
posed training methodology can be applied to all neural net-
works that have activation functions. CNNs are typically
composed of four computation operations:
• Matrix multiplication. In fully connected layers, the
computation is the multiplication of two matrices.
• Convolution. Convolutional layers apply some de-
signed filters to extract features from the input matrix.
• Pooling In such layers, a function such as max or aver-
age is used to aggregate data.
• Non-linear activation. In order to model nonlinearity,
the neural network introduces the activation function
during the evaluation of neuron outputs. The tradi-
tional way to evaluate a neuron output f as a function
g of its input z is with f = g(z) where g can be a sig-
moid function or a hyperbolic tangent function. Both
of these functions are saturating non-linear. That is,
the range of either function is fixed between a mini-
mum and maximum. Non-saturating activation func-
tion ReLU proposed by [12] can also be used.
Out of the four steps, the first two steps are reversible,
in that, if one gets a hold of the output of a neural network
layer and its model parameters, one can recreate the layer’s
input. The third step is irreversible since the pooling step
aggregates inputs using an operator such as average, max,
and min. For example, given an average of n numbers, one
cannot recreate the original n numbers. For the last step,
sigmoid and hyperbolic tangent functions are one-to-one
functions so both are reversible. On the other hand, ReLU
is an irreversible function, but our experiments showed that
inputs to ReLU can be recovered from its outputs well.
4 Distributed Layer-Partitioned Training
In this section, we first describe the system architecture
of our distributed layer-partitioned training. We then ex-
plain how to derive raw training data out of CNNs’ first
convolutional layer from its outputs. Next, we explain how
to reverse-engineer the three conventional activation func-
tions. Finally, we propose a step-wise activation function.
4.1 System Architecture
Fig. 1 illustrates the architecture of our proposed training
system. Our system keeps the design of a CNN model un-
changed but partitions it into two different parts. One is the
first convolutional layer that is secured in a local machine
Our Proposed Methodology
• Our main ideas
• Only irreversible and unrecognized metadata leaves local sites.
• We propose
• Distributed layer-partitioned training built on conventional training paradigm
• Step-wise activation functions
Secured Local Host
…
Cloud Servers
Figure 1. The high-level view of our system
architecture includes: 1) a secured local host
having raw data and the first convolutional
layer of a CNN model and 2) a cloud server
that is responsible for the rest computation.
and produces the metadata; the other is the rest of the layers
that are to be trained on the metadata on distributed sites.
Based on this training architecture, we avoid exposing
the raw data out of a local secured site. However, if we
simply enforce the first convolutional layer of a CNN on
the local site, the potential risk of recovering the original
data still remains, which we explain in the next subsection.
4.2 Risk of Generic Convolutional Layers
Assume the input data has the dimension (Cin, Hin,Win),
and the output result and the kernels of the first con-
volutional layer has the dimension (Cout, Hout,Wout) and
the size (S × S), respectively. Thus, the weights of the
convolutional kernels in the first layer has the dimension
(Cout, Cin, S, S). Based on our assumptions, the problem
of recovering the input data of the convolutional layer from
its output can be formulated as solving a system of linear
equations: Ax = b, where x is the input data, A stands for
the weights of the convolutional kernels in the first layer,
and b is the output of the first layer. In the linear equa-
tions, the number of the unknown parameters we need to
solve is Cin×Hin×Win, and the number of the equations is
Cout ×Hout ×Wout. Therefore, if Cout is large enough, this
system of linear equations has a unique solution x∗ that is
the same as the original input data. Please note that due to
the nature of the convolutional operation, these linear equa-
tions are not dependent.
However, if the dimension of the input data is high, e.g.
the images in CIFAR-10, the system of linear equations be-
comes too large to be solved due to the limitation of the
computation power. Thus, we divide the linear system into
many small sub-systems {Aixi = bi | ∀i}, and the solu-
tions {x∗i | ∀i} is equal to x∗. In some cases, this may lead
to the following situation: x∗ is unique, but {x∗i | ∀i} is
not. However, if the number of the convolutional kernels is
less than or equal to Cout, we can show that
x∗ is unique iff {x∗i | ∀i} is unique.
In the following, we elaborate the method dividing the orig-
inal system of linear equations into sub-systems. First, we
denote the weights of the ith convolutional kernel as ωi
that is a tensor of weights. After we fix a pair (hout, wout),
which corresponds to the location of the output results,
we can trace back the location of the input tensor, de-
noted as (Hin,Win). Moreover, this corresponding space
[Images](Cin,Hin,Win) is equal to the size of ωi, for i =
1, . . . , Cout. Therefore, we can state the linear system as∑
ω1  [Image](Cin,Hin,Win) = [Output](1,hout,wout)
...∑
ωCout  [Image](Cin,Hin,Win) = [Output](Cout,hout,wout),
where  is the element-wised products. It is clear that we
have the unique solution [Image]∗(Cin,Hin,Win) if and only if
Cout × Hout ×Wout is larger than Cin × Hin ×Win. Based
on the above-mentioned method, there exists an effective
way to derive the original input data from the outputs of
generic convolutional layers. Consequently, if the metadata
is caught and the local convoluational layer is compromised,
the original data is vulnerable to be leaked.
4.3 Risk of Conventional Activation Functions
In this subsection, we explain the approach to derive the
inputs of three conventional activation functions from their
outputs, revealing the potential privacy problem. Basically,
if we can infer the inverse functions of these three activation
functions, the input data can be obtained easily.
The sigmoid function is one of the widely used activa-
tion functions. Because sigmoid is a bijective function, its
unique inverse function exists, namely
z = sigmoid−1(y) = − ln (1
y
− 1).
Similarly, the hyperbolic tangent function is also bijec-
tive, and its inverse function is defined as follows:
tanh −1(z) =
ln (1 + z)− ln (1− z)
2
.
Unlike the prior two activation functions, ReLU is the
only surjective function, which is ReLU(z) = max(0, z).
Thus, we could reverse the result of ReLU only if the output
is positive and use the following method to reconstruct the
input information. First, we pick those equations with posi-
tive values. Second, if the number of linear equations is still
insufficient to solve the inputs, we meet the requirement of
the equation number by including some of the zero-valued
equations. Lastly, we can solve the system of linear equa-
tions as if ReLU is an identity.
Figure 2. A step-wise activation example.
4.4 Step-Wise Activation Function
To make the information irreversible, we modify the con-
ventional activation functions to be step-wise. We perform
quantization on the original functions. Fig. 2 shows one
step-wise version of sigmoid function. Formally, we divide
the input domain into intervals and make the output step-
wise. Given the number of intervals n, the clipping value v
and an activation function g, the step-wise version of g is
gstep(x) = g(sign(x) · bmin(|x|, v)
v/n
c · v
n
),
where sign(·) is a function that returns 1 if its input is non-
negative, and −1 otherwise.
5 Preliminary Evaluation
We performed experiments to verify that 1) models
trained using our proposed method can reach equivalent
accuracy, and 2) raw images cannot be reversed after our
proposed step-wise functions were applied. We applied
our method to MobileNetV2 [13] on two standard image
datasets: MNIST [10] and CIFAR-10 [8]. We chose these
two public datasets because they have a long record of serv-
ing as benchmarks in machine learning [1]. In all of our
experiments, we utilized SGD with momentum to train the
models and ran 90 epochs by using the same initialization
method and hyper-parameter settings.
To examine the effect of our method on prediction accu-
racy, we substituted our step-wise sigmoid functions with
different interval values n for the first activation function
in MobileNetV2, whereas the other components remain un-
changed. Table. 1 shows that the accuracy of the model
using our step-wise sigmoid increases as the value of n in-
creases. In comparison with the accuracy of the model using
the original sigmoid, the accuracy degradation of using our
step-wise sigmoid with n = 21 is negligible for MNIST.
This result provides us a setting to maintain equivalent ac-
curacy. On the more complicated CIFAR-10 [8] dataset,
the accuracy degradation using our privacy-preserved is less
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
CIFAR-10
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
MNIST
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
CIFAR-10
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
MNIST
Figure 3. (a) original images, (b) ∼ (e) re-
versed results of convolutional layers w/o ac-
tivation function, w/ sigmoid, w/ hyperbolic
tangent, w/ ReLU, (f) ∼ (i) reversed results of
our proposed step-wise function on sigmoid
with the clipping value v = 10 and the number
of intervals n set to 3, 5, 11 and 21.
Table 1. Accuracy with and without step-wise
activation function. M and C stand for MINST
and CIFAR-10, respectively.
Sig. Step.n = 3
Step.
n = 5
Step.
n = 11
Step.
n = 21
M. 99.68% 10.28% 23.27% 99.57% 99.65%
C. 86.94% 13.74% 23.45% 49.91% 81.28%
competitive. A further increase in the interval value n is ex-
pected to increase its accuracy.
To evaluate the capability of preserving data privacy, we
visualized the input images from the outputs of the first
convolutional layer in our experimental models by using
the method described in the previous section. The results
shown in Fig. 3 demonstrate that most reversed inputs of
our proposed step-wise sigmoid functions are unrecogniz-
able. Qualitatively, this result demonstrates that our pro-
posed scheme to be effective in preserving data privacy.
6 Conclusion
Our proposed distributed layer-partition training with
step-wise activation functions can protect the original data
against malicious attacks better. The preliminary evalua-
tion shows our proposed methodology successfully creates
considerable difficulties for recovering raw data even if the
metadata is captured and the underlying weights are com-
promised by adversaries. We also observe that tradeoffs ex-
ist between accuracy and data privacy. Based on our obser-
vation, a hospital can set the interval parameter properly to
achieve the desired balance between accuracy and privacy.
As future work, we will investigate what the ideal interval
values of different settings are and extend our idea to work
with other tasks such as object detection and segmentation.
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